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Available online 25 February 2015The neural basis and cognitive functions of various spontaneous thought processes, particularlymind-wandering,
are increasingly being investigated. Although strong links have been drawnbetween the occurrence of spontane-
ous thought processes and activation in brain regions comprising thedefaultmode network (DMN), spontaneous
thought also appears to recruit other, non-DMN regions just as consistently. Here we present the ﬁrst quantita-
tivemeta-analysis of neuroimaging studies of spontaneous thought andmind-wandering in order to address the
question of their neural correlates. Examining 24 functional neuroimaging studies of spontaneous thought pro-
cesses, we conducted a meta-analysis using activation likelihood estimation (ALE). A number of key DMN
areas showed consistent recruitment across studies, including medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate cor-
tex,medial temporal lobe, and bilateral inferior parietal lobule. Numerous non-DMN regions, however, were also
consistently recruited, including rostrolateral prefrontal cortex, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, insula,
temporopolar cortex, secondary somatosensory cortex, and lingual gyrus. These meta-analytic results indicate
that DMN activation alone is insufﬁcient to adequately capture the neural basis of spontaneous thought;
frontoparietal control network areas, and other non-DMN regions, appear to be equally central. We conclude
that further progress in the cognitive and clinical neuroscience of spontaneous thought will therefore require a
re-balancing of our view of the contributions of various regions and networks throughout the brain, and beyond
the DMN.
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Beneath the surface of our everyday behavior ﬂows a stream of
spontaneous thoughts, emotions, and memories. These undirected
forms of thought are usually referred to as daydreaming, stimulus-
independent thought, or mind-wandering (Christoff, 2012; Christoff
et al., 2004, 2009; Fox and Christoff, 2014; Killingsworth and Gilbert,
2010; Mason et al., 2007; McGuire et al., 1996; Singer, 1966; Singer
and Antrobus, 1972; Smallwood and Schooler, 2006, 2014). The term
mind-wandering should in no way suggest that spontaneous forms of
thought are random or meaningless, however. In fact, ﬁrst-person con-
tent reports indicate that, however inexplicable its origin may seem,
spontaneous thought is strongly related to one's goals, concerns, and ex-
periences in everyday life (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014b; Christoff et al.,
2011; Fox and Christoff, 2014; Fox et al., 2013; Klinger, 2008; McMillan
et al., 2013; Smallwood and Andrews-Hanna, 2013). Spontaneous
thought, then, refers to the type of thought that we recognize as our
own creation without yet understanding its ontogeny or purpose — if
any (for more detailed discussions, see Christoff et al., 2011; Fox and
Christoff, 2014).
Cognitive psychology and neuroscience have so far focused the bulk
of their efforts on studying goal-directed thought (Christoff, 2012, 2013;
Fox and Christoff, 2014). As important as such processes are, however,
the past few decades have seen a growing recognition that spontaneous
mental processes are extremely common during restful waking states
and minimally-demanding tasks (Kane et al., 2007; Killingsworth and
Gilbert, 2010; Singer, 1966). Any cognitive process that occurs so fre-
quently and ubiquitously is of inherent interest to cognitive neuroscien-
tists, but there are other reasons for developing a more completemodel
of the neural correlates of these spontaneous thought processes.
Spontaneous thought processes appear to play a role at the extreme
poles of human ﬂourishing and clinical conditions: in creative thinking
and problem-solving on the one hand (Baird et al., 2012; Ellamil et al.,
2012), and indepressive rumination, post-traumatic stressdisorder, and
other mental health disorders on the other (Andrews-Hanna et al.,
2014b; Berman et al., 2011; Ehlers et al., 2004; Nolen-Hoeksema,
2000; Whitﬁeld-Gabrieli and Ford, 2012).
The growing appreciation of the importance of spontaneous cogni-
tion has coincided with the parallel discovery that a consistent ‘default
mode’ of brain function characterizes the human resting state in func-
tional neuroimaging experiments (Buckner et al., 2008; Gusnard et al.,
2001; Raichle, 2010; Raichle et al., 2001; Raichle and Snyder, 2007;
Shulman et al., 1997). The hypothesized connection (Gusnard et al.,
2001; Raichle et al., 2001) between spontaneous thought processes
and activation of the default mode network (DMN) has now beenwide-
ly validated in cognitive and clinical neuroscience (Dixon et al., 2014;
Fox and Christoff, 2014). However, this relationship has come to over-
shadow the possible contribution of non-DMN regions to spontaneous
thought. Our own empirical neuroimaging work (Andrews-Hanna
et al., 2010a; Christoff, 2012; Christoff et al., 2004, 2009), as well as
that of many other research groups (Binder et al., 1999; D'Argembeau
et al., 2005; Dumontheil et al., 2010; Mason et al., 2007; McGuire
et al., 1996; McKiernan et al., 2006; Spiers and Maguire, 2006a;
Stawarczyk et al., 2011b;Wang et al., 2009), has consistently shown re-
cruitment of non-DMN regions during mind-wandering and related
forms of spontaneous thought. Yet the robustness of these ﬁndings
has remained largely unacknowledged and, until now, unexamined by
systematic whole-brain meta-analysis. As a consequence, activity in afew selected DMN regions-of-interest (ROIs) continues to be used
as the standard, and by implication, sufﬁcient neural indicator of
mind-wandering in both healthy (Stawarczyk et al., 2011b;
Vanhaudenhuyse et al., 2011) and clinical (Anticevic et al., 2012;
Berman et al., 2011; Whitﬁeld-Gabrieli and Ford, 2012) populations.
Restricting analyses to DMN regions is problematic for at least two
other reasons. For one, the subjective variety of spontaneous thought
modes (which can includememory recall, planning for the future, hypo-
thetical imaginings, mentalizing, and so on) suggest correspondingly
complex and variegated neural correlates (Andrews-Hanna et al.,
2013; Dixon et al., 2014; Fox and Christoff, 2014; Fox et al., 2013); a sim-
ple DMN-mind-wandering mapping is unlikely to fulﬁll this criterion.
Moreover, despite its involvement in spontaneous thought, the DMN
is implicated in many cognitive processes that may not be spontaneous,
such as famous face recognition (Spreng et al., 2014). It therefore seems
likely that other brain areas and/or networks play a role in spontaneous
thought.
Herewe present ameta-analysis that speciﬁcally aimed to assess the
consistency of recruitment of various regions throughout the brain dur-
ing spontaneous thought processes. Rather than focusing on DMN con-
tributions, we took a whole-brain approach to carry out a quantitative
meta-analysis of the 24 functional neuroimaging studies of mind-
wandering and related spontaneous thought processes published to
date (see Table 1 for a list of the studies).
Methods
Search strategy
To identify neuroimaging studies related to mind wandering and
spontaneous thought, we conducted a comprehensive and systematic
search of the literature using MEDLINE (http://www.pubmed.com),
Google Scholar (http://scholar.google.com), and PsycINFO (http://
www.apa.org/pub/databases/psycinfo/index.aspx) for papers contain-
ing the words ‘mind-wandering’; ‘mind wandering’; ‘spontaneous
thought’; ‘stimulus-independent thought’; ‘task-unrelated thought’; or
‘daydreaming,’ from October 2014 to 1996, the year the ﬁrst explicit
functional neuroimaging study of spontaneous thought was published
(McGuire et al., 1996). This list of articles was further reﬁned by
searching within results for studies that contained any of the words
or phrases ‘magnetic resonance imaging’, ‘MRI,’ ‘positron emission
tomography,’ ‘neuroimaging,’ or ‘brain’ within the title or abstract. Of
the candidate studies, every abstract was read to conﬁrm whether
functional neuroimaging methods to study mind-wandering or related
spontaneous thought processes was employed (see details of in-
clusion and exclusion criteria in the next section). The reference lists
of each included study, as well as those of several major reviews
(Andrews-Hanna, 2012; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014b; Christoff,
2012), were also searched, to ensure completeness.
Study inclusion and exclusion criteria
All studies using functional neuroimaging (i.e., functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) or positron emission tomography (PET))
were considered, but studies using purely morphometric neuroimaging
methods to studymind-wandering (e.g., cortical thickness in Bernhardt
et al., 2014)were not included. Using the search strategy detailed above,
a total of 24 studies were collected (Table 1).
Table 1
Functional neuroimaging studies examining various forms of mind-wandering or spontaneous thought.
Study Analysis Peak
foci
Design N Mind-wandering
measurea
Spontaneous thought type
McGuire et al. (1996) WB & ROI 5 Blocked 5/6 Retrospective Verbal stimulus-independent thoughts during rest
Binder et al. (1999) WB 8 Blocked 14 Inferential Task-unrelated thought during rest
Christoff et al. (2004) WB 15 Blocked 12 Assumptive Spontaneous thought during rest
D'Argembeau et al. (2005) WB 9 Blocked 13 Retrospective Spontaneous thought during rest
McKiernan et al. (2006) ROI – Blocked 30 Inferential Task-unrelated thought during auditory task
Spiers & Maguire (2006b) WB & ROI 24 ER 20 Retrospective (Online) Spontaneous mentalizing during navigation task
Mason et al. (2007) WB resting state→
Functionally-deﬁned ROIs
20 Blocked 19 Inferential and Questionnaire Mind-wandering during highly practiced task
Christoff et al. (2009) WB 34 ER 15 Online Mind-wandering during SART
Wang et al. (2009) WB & ROI 8 Blocked 13 Questionnaire Spontaneous thought during rest
Andrews-Hanna et al. (2010a) ROI; seed-based FC – Blocked 30/139 Surprise retrospective Spontaneous thought during passive ﬁxation
Dumontheil et al. (2010) WB 20 Blocked 16 Retrospective Task-unrelated thought during various simple tasks
Stawarczyk et al. (2011b) ROI/Supp. WB 14 ER 22 Online Mind-wandering during SART
Vanhaudenhuyse et al. (2011) ROI – ER 22 Online Intensity of internal awareness during rest
Christoff (2012) ROI; seed-based FC – ER 15 Online Mind-wandering during SART
Hasenkamp et al. (2012) WB – ER 14 Online Mind-wandering during meditation
Hasenkamp and Barsalou (2012) ROI; seed-based FC – ER 14 Online Mind-wandering during meditation
Allen et al. (2013) ROI – ER 21/21 Online Task-unrelated thought during EAT
Kucyi et al. (2013) WB – Blocked 51 Online Mind-wandering during painful stimuli
Moss et al. (2013) Functional localizer-
deﬁned ROIs
– Blocked 15 Retrospective Mind-wandering during reading
Smallwood et al. (2013b) WB – ER 16 Assumptive Stimulus-independent thought during various tasks
Smallwood et al. (2013a) ROI – Blocked 42 Online Mind-wandering during reading
Gorgolewski et al. (2014) WB – Blocked 166 Retrospective Self-generated thought during rest
Kucyi and Davis (2014) ROI – Blocked 51 Online Mind-wandering during painful stimuli
Tusche et al. (2014) ROI – ER 30 Online Self-generated thought during rest
All studies were conducted using fMRI, exceptMcGuire et al. (1996) and D'Argembeau et al. (2005), which used PET. N=sample size (experimental/control group, if applicable). Studies
employing whole-brain analyses that were included in the meta-analysis are listed in bold font. The number of peak activation foci contributed from each study is indicated in the
third column. EAT: Error Awareness Task; ER: event-related; FC: functional connectivity; ROI: region of interest; SART: Sustained Attention to Response Task; Supp.: supplemental;
WB: whole-brain.
a See Methods for a discussion of mind-wandering measures.
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(results from abstracts, presented talks, etc., were excluded). To be in-
cluded, studies had to: (i) report speciﬁc peak foci of activation in either
Talairach or Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) space; (ii) report
group results (case studies of single subjects were excluded); and (iii)
involve healthy, non-clinical, ‘normal’ populations.
A fourth criterion was employed to ensure that some form of spon-
taneous thought was taking place: included studies had to (iv) employ
some form of retrospective, online, or questionnaire self-report mea-
sure that indicated frequency or depth of spontaneous thought process-
es (a single exception to this criterion was allowed for an early fMRI
study, because it was otherwise speciﬁcally designed to detect activa-
tions associated with spontaneous thought (Christoff et al., 2004); ex-
clusion of this study did not appreciably alter the meta-analytic
results, but its inclusion increased the power of our analysis). This crite-
rion avoids thewidespread reverse inference that is particularly present
in this ﬁeld (Christoff and Owen, 2006; Poldrack, 2006),where DMNac-
tivity is frequently interpreted as indirect evidence of mind-wandering-
like processes (in the absence of any reports to that effect from partici-
pants themselves). This criterion also allowed for comparison of sponta-
neous thought frequency across multiple conditions, and therefore for a
common feature across all the contrasts and studies included here (de-
spite difference in comparison/control conditions; see below). All con-
trasts included in this meta-analysis represent a comparison between
some state of higher spontaneous thought frequencywith a correspond-
ing period or task involving lower spontaneous thought frequency, or,
similarly, regions where higher activity predicted higher rates of
mind-wandering. Furthermore, all these spontaneous thought frequen-
cy ratings are derived directly from questionnaires, experience sam-
pling probes, and so on, rather than based on assumptions about
when spontaneous thought frequency should be higher or lower. The
mind-wandering measures employed included (a) post-scan retrospec-
tive reports (e.g., D'Argembeau et al., 2005; McGuire et al., 1996);
(b) online, trial-by-trial ﬁrst-person reports of whether spontaneousthoughts were occurring or not (e.g., Christoff et al., 2009; Stawarczyk
et al., 2011b); and (c) questionnaires purporting tomeasure ‘trait’ levels
of fantasy and spontaneous thought (e.g., Wang et al., 2009). A ﬁnal
method was (d) inferential, in that mind-wandering scores on a given
block or task for a group tested only behaviorally were assumed to
hold for a separate group of participants tested in the scanner
(e.g., Mason et al., 2007). Details for each study are provided in Table 2.
As a ﬁfth criterion studies had to (v) report whole-brain results.
Studies that reported activation foci in ways other than 3D coordinate
space were excluded (e.g. ROI analysis) as they are not compatible
with the activation likelihood estimation (ALE) analysis approach. Fur-
ther, ROI ﬁndings tend to be biased toward the DMN, reinforcing the
false notion that the DMN is speciﬁcally (or exclusively) involved in
mind-wandering.
Studies satisfying all ﬁve criteria (and therefore included in the
meta-analysis) are listed in bold font in Table 2. A total of 10 of the 24
studies were included; failure to satisfy criterion (v) accounted for the
majority of exclusions (details in Table 2). Two studies (Hasenkamp
et al., 2012; Kucyi et al., 2013) met all ﬁve criteria, but involved other
potentially confounding factors. The ﬁrst (Hasenkamp et al., 2012)
employed a population of expert meditation practitioners, who may
have altered frequency of mind-wandering (Mrazek et al., 2013), as
well as altered brain activity during periods of rest with high levels of
mind-wandering (Brewer et al., 2011). The second study (Kucyi et al.,
2013) examined the relationship between mind-wandering and pain,
administrating painful electrical nerve stimulation during the sessions
wheremind-wanderingwas reported, again presenting a potential con-
found. To avoid these confounds affecting our meta-analytic results
these studies were excluded (although their inclusion did not apprecia-
bly impact the present ﬁndings).
One study by Spiers and Maguire (2006a) was followed up with a
similar study using the same subjects, dataset, and baseline condition,
but somewhat different spontaneous mental activity as the condition
of interest (Spiers and Maguire, 2006b). As inclusion of both studies
Table 2
Brain areas consistently activated by mind-wandering and related spontaneous thought processes.
Region Cluster size (mm3) Peak ALE value Peak in MNI space (x, y, z) Brodmann area Studies contributing to cluster
Frontal lobe
Dorsal anterior cingulate cortex 2920 0.0144 −5, 27, 39 (Fig. 2a) 32 a, e, g, h
R dorsolateral/rostrolateral prefrontal cortex 1656 0.0085 45, 43,−8 (Figs. 2e, g) 46/10 d, i
L ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 1320 0.0090 −35, 10,−26 (Fig. 2d) 47/11 c, g, j
Rostromedial prefrontal cortex 1256 0.0081 3, 61, 13 (Fig. 2b) 10/9 e, f
Medial prefrontal cortex; anterior cingulate cortex 1080 0.0089 4, 42, 3 (Fig. 2b) 24/32 f, g
Parietal lobe
Precuneus; posterior cingulate cortex 3784 0.0123 −8,−56, 39 (Fig. 2a) 7/31 b, d, f, g, h, j
L inferior parietal lobule; angular gyrus 2616 0.0092 −46,−72, 25 (Fig. 2d) 39 b, e, f, g, h
R inferior parietal lobule; supramarginal gyrus 1808 0.0098 56,−51, 33 (Fig. 2f) 40/39 d, f, i
R secondary somatosensory cortex 1416 0.0097 24,−39, 56 (Fig. 2i) 5/40 c, e, g
Temporal lobe
L parahippocampus 3496 0.0196 −27,−37,−18 (Fig. 2h) 36 b, c, f, g, h
L temporopolar cortex 2608 0.0116 −50,−1,−5 (Fig. 2g) 38 f, g, i
L mid-insula 1032 0.0126 −42, 29,−12 (Fig. 2g) 13 e, j
Occipital lobe
L lingual gyrus 1936 0.0092 −15,−66, 5 (Fig. 2c) 19/18/30 c, e, g, j
Signiﬁcant meta-analytic clusters, with peak coordinates, for spontaneous thought N control conditions. BA: Brodmann area. a: McGuire et al. (1996); b: Binder et al. (1999); c: Christoff
et al. (2004); d: D'Argembeau et al. (2005); e: Spiers &Maguire (2006b); f: Mason et al. (2007); g: Christoff et al. (2009); h:Wang et al. (2009); i: Dumontheil et al. (2010); j: Stawarczyk
et al. (2011b).
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data, only one studywas included. The former study involved spontane-
ous mentalizing, which is very common during mind-wandering and
related forms of spontaneous cognition (Fox et al., 2013), and so was
retained. The latter study instead investigated spontaneous route-
planning during virtual navigation, which bears much less resemblance
to the various other forms of spontaneous thought examined here, and
so was not included in the meta-analysis.
Adjustment of peak coordinates
Some included studies reported results in Talairach coordinates. For
consistency,we converted all coordinates toMNI space using non-linear
transformations in theWFU PickAtlas software package (Maldjian et al.,
2003).
A small but substantial number of peak foci (n=15) were reported
at coordinates that lay outside of the template brain images usedwithin
the activation likelihood estimation meta-analysis software, GingerALE.
To avoid data loss, we performed aminimum linear translation of these
peak coordinates in MNI space to ﬁt within the GingerALE template
mask. In all cases these translations were minimal (mean = 3.87 mm;
range: 1–10 mm), and in no case did adjusted peak foci subsequently
fall within a different brain region from that listed in the results tables
of the original publication. Full details of these translations, including
the original and adjusted foci, are available in the online Supplementary
materials (Table S1).
Activation likelihood estimation (ALE) meta-analysis
We used a quantitative, random-effects meta-analytic method
known as activation likelihood estimation (ALE) (Eickhoff et al., 2009,
2012; Laird et al., 2005; Turkeltaub et al., 2002, 2012) implemented in
the software program GingerALE 2.3.1 (San Antonio, TX: UT Health Sci-
ence Center Research Imaging Institute). Themost recent ALE algorithm
tests for above-chance clustering of peak foci from different experi-
ments included in the meta-analysis (Eickhoff et al., 2009, 2012) by
comparing actual activation foci locations/clustering with a null distri-
bution that includes the same number of peak foci distributed randomly
throughout the brain's gray matter. Included activation foci were
smoothed using a full-width half maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel
dependent on the sample size (subjects) of the experiment from
which foci were drawn (larger sample–Nsmaller smoothing kernel —empirically determined by Eickhoff et al., 2009, 2012). Resulting statis-
tical maps show clusters where convergence between activation foci is
greater than would be expected by chance (i.e., if foci from each exper-
iment were distributed independently).
We analyzed a total of 157 foci from 10 neuroimaging studies (stud-
ies in bold font in Table 1). Statistical maps were thresholded using a
false discovery rate (FDR — see Genovese et al., 2002) of q= .05 and a
cluster threshold of k=1000mm3.Weused this relatively liberal statis-
tical threshold, but high cluster threshold, in order to better visualize re-
sults and to ensure that cross-study convergence was not neglected
in this relatively small-sample meta-analysis. Similar results were
found at more conservative statistical thresholds. Region classiﬁcations
follow those indicated in the Multi-Image Analysis GUI (‘Mango’)
image-viewing software (UT Health Science Center Research Imaging
Institute) used to visualize the meta-analytic results. The Duvernoy
neuroanatomical atlas was also consulted (Duvernoy et al., 1991).
Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 were created in the mricron software package (http://
www.mccauslandcenter.sc.edu/mricro/mricron/index.html; (Rorden
et al., 2007)). Fig. 3 was created by overlaying our meta-analytic statis-
tical map onto a surface brain projection using the Caret software (Van
Essen, 2005), with network demarcations derived from resting-state
functional connectivityMRI in a sample of 1000 adults (Yeo et al., 2011).Results
We found 13 regions to be reliably involved in mindwandering and
spontaneous thought (Table 2; Fig. 1). These regions included all major
hubs of the DMN: rostromedial prefrontal cortex, medial prefrontal
cortex/anterior cingulate cortex, precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex,
bilateral inferior parietal lobule, and left medial temporal lobe/
parahippocampal cortex (extending somewhat into the cerebellum).
We also found signiﬁcant clusters outside the DMN, including the dorsal
anterior cingulate cortex, right dorsolateral/rostrolateral prefrontal cor-
tex, left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, secondary somatosensory cor-
tex, left temporopolar cortex, left mid insula, and left lingual gyrus. A
detailed representation of the results is presented in Fig. 1, which
shows all signiﬁcant meta-analytic differences in their entirety through
25 horizontal slices. A more focused representation is given in Fig. 2,
which, for added clarity, depicts the peak of each signiﬁcant meta-
analytic cluster from the viewpoint/orientation most common for each
given region.
Fig. 1.Meta-analytic activations associated with mind-wandering and related spontaneous thought processes throughout the entire brain. Horizontal slices presented with 3 mm skip.
Color bar indicates ALE likelihood values (see Methods). White numbers denote vertical stereotactic coordinates (z) in MNI space. See Table 2 for detailed quantitative results.
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Overview
The aim of the present meta-analysis was to impartially interrogate
whole-brain neuroimaging results of various forms of spontaneous
thought to investigate (i) the extent to which the DMN is implicated
and (ii) the extent to which regions and brain networks outside the
boundaries of the DMN are involved. Our quantitativemeta-analysis re-
vealed consistent activations throughout the brain (Figs. 1 and 2), but
predominantly in limbic, paralimbic, and association cortices. Primary
sensory cortices were conspicuously absent, although clusters were
observed in secondary visual and somatosensory areas. The wide corti-
cal distribution of these meta-analytic ﬁndings likely reﬂects thecorresponding diversity of mental processes and content denoted by
the umbrella terms ‘mind-wandering’ and ‘spontaneous thought’. Far
from indicating a deﬁnitive set of neural correlates for spontaneous
thought, the results suggest that numerous forms of spontaneous
thought could be differentiated at the neural level (see below).
Default mode network involvement in spontaneous thought
Our meta-analysis provided strong evidence that the DMN, which
characterizes the ‘resting’ state, is involved in spontaneous thought pro-
cess of various kinds— an idea with a lengthy precedent. In some of the
very earliest human neuroimaging studies, resting brain activity was al-
ready proposed to contribute to the internal stream of thinking (Ingvar,
1979). Additionally, a potential role of theDMN inmind-wandering-like
Fig. 2. Peaks of eachmeta-analytic cluster of activation associatedwithmind-wandering and related spontaneous thought processes. Peaks for each of 13 signiﬁcantmeta-analytic clusters
of activation associated with mind-wandering and related spontaneous thought processes. (a) Posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex. (b) Medial pre-
frontal cortex/anterior cingulate cortex and rostromedial prefrontal cortex. (c) Left lingual gyrus (largest cluster). (d) From left to right: left inferior parietal lobule/angular gyrus; leftmid-
insula; and left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. (e) Right rostrolateral/dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. (f) Right inferior parietal lobule/supramarginal gyrus. (g) Left temporopolar cortex and
mid-insula; right rostrolateral/dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. (h) Left parahippocampus/medial temporal lobe, extending into the cerebellum. (i) Right secondary somatosensory cortex.
Color bar indicates ALE likelihood values (see Methods). See Table 2 and Fig. 1 for more detailed results. Stereotactic coordinates (x, y, z) are in MNI space. L: left; R: right.
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network (Andreasen et al., 1995; Gusnard et al., 2001; McGuire et al.,
1996; Raichle et al., 2001). We found strong evidence in support of
this notion, with meta-analytic clusters in almost all DMN regions:
rostromedial prefrontal cortex (BA 9/10), anterior cingulate cortex (BA
24/32), ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 47/11), posterior cingulate
cortex (BA 31), bilateral posterior inferior parietal lobule (BA 39/40),
and the medial temporal lobe (especially the parahippocampus/BA
36). All of these meta-analytic clusters overlap with regions that are
widely thought of as being part of the DMN (Buckner et al., 2008; Yeo
et al., 2011).
Recent work has shown that the DMN can be parcellated into
multiple component subsystems (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010b,
2014b; Yeo et al., 2011). A medial temporal subsystem comprises most
of the clusters observed here: medial temporal lobe, retrosplenial
cortex, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, and posterior inferior parietal
lobule; a dorsal medial subsystem comprises the dorsomedial prefrontal
cortex, temporoparietal junction, lateral temporal cortex, and
temporopolar cortex. The anterior medial prefrontal cortex and posteri-
or cingulate cortex appear to act as major hubs interacting with and
connecting these two subsystems.
Evidence from meta-analyses of the task-based literature suggests
that these default network componentsmay support different cognitive
functions (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014b). The medial temporal subsys-
tem is activated during episodic memory recall and future thinking
tasks, and is hypothesized to play a role in retrieving past informationand ﬂexibly binding this information into a coherent mental scene
(e.g., Hassabis and Maguire, 2007; Schacter et al., 2012). In contrast,
the dorsal medial subsystem activates during social tasks, particularly
those that involve internal/reﬂective processing such as mentalizing
(i.e., inferring the mental states of other people, and evaluating one's
own; Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014a; Lieberman, 2007; Schilbach et al.,
2012). Consistent with a central, hub-like role, the anterior medial
prefrontal cortex and posterior cingulate cortex activate across a
wide range of tasks, includingmnemonic and social tasks, and those in-
volving self-related processing. These regions may allow us to assess
the personal signiﬁcance of a variety of external and internal sources
of information and construct an overarching personal meaning
(D'Argembeau, 2013; Roy et al., 2012).
Paralleling the task-related literature, there is considerable evidence
from phenomenological studies that mind-wandering is a heteroge-
neous set of cognitive processes, evoking multiple types of content
that vary both within and across individuals (Andrews-Hanna et al.,
2014b; Smallwood and Schooler, 2006, 2014). A clear prediction for fu-
ture studies, then, is that activity in different default network subsys-
tems during mind-wandering might be associated with different types
of mental content. Below, we discuss this possibility further.
Frontoparietal control network involvement in spontaneous thought
Mind-wandering and related spontaneous thought processes con-
sistently recruited many regions of the frontoparietal control network
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gulate cortex (BA 32), right rostrolateral/dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(BA 10/46), right anterior inferior parietal lobule (BA 39/40), and
precuneus (BA 7) (Table 2; Figs. 1–3). The frontoparietal control net-
work plays a central role in goal-directed cognition (Niendam et al.,
2012). This role extends from classic measures of executive functioning
to personally relevant goal-directed tasks, such as planning for the fu-
ture (Gerlach et al., 2014; Spreng et al., 2010). In the latter capacity, it
tends to be activated in unison with DMN areas, so we discuss its
potential role in spontaneous thought in the following section, which
addresses DMN-frontoparietal control network coupling in the genera-
tion of spontaneous thought.Coupling of the default mode and frontoparietal control networks
Manymeta-analytic clusters fell within the borders of either the de-
fault mode (Buckner et al., 2008; Raichle et al., 2001; Shulman et al.,
1997) or fronto-parietal control network (Spreng et al., 2013; Vincent
et al., 2008; Yeo et al., 2011). We visualize the extent of this overlap
by plotting our meta-analytic clusters on an ‘inﬂated’ brain template
with border outlines for both networks in Fig. 3. The borders of the
two networks are based on previously published, large-scale (n =
1000) resting state datasets (Yeo et al., 2011), whereas the green clus-
ters of activation represent our whole-brain meta-analytic results
(from Table 2; Fig. 1).
Although ourmeta-analytic results cannot directly address the tem-
poral correlation of these brain activations, such results are consistent
with observations of temporal coupling of DMN and fronto-parietal
control network areas (e.g., Christoff, 2012; Spreng et al., 2010). Sponta-
neous thought is not the only cognitive process, however, to exhibit co-
activation of, and functional connectivity (i.e., temporal coupling) be-
tween, the default mode and frontoparietal control networks. Similar
ﬁndings have been observed in autobiographical memory recall
(Spreng et al., 2009), mentalizing or ‘theory of mind’ (Spiers and
Maguire, 2006a; Spreng et al., 2009), creative generation and evaluation
of artwork (Ellamil et al., 2012), and goal-directed prospection (Gerlach
et al., 2014; Spreng et al., 2009). Intriguingly, memory recall,Fig. 3.Mind-wandering/spontaneous thought brain activations contrastedwith thedefaultmod
with mind-wandering and related spontaneous thought processes (green clusters) juxtaposed
(red).Meta-analyticmind-wandering activations overlap considerablywith both networks, but
somatosensory areas, and downstream visual areas in the lingual gyrus). DMN and frontoparie
et al. (2011).mentalizing, creative recombination of ideas, and thoughts about the fu-
ture mark the dominant themes of spontaneous thought content from
the subjective point of view (reviewed in Fox et al., 2013; Klinger,
2008), making these overlapping brain activations intriguing avenues
for future research. Resting-state functional connectivity analysis has
revealed that there is an extensive intrinsic architecture to support dy-
namic interactions between the default and frontoparietal control net-
works (Spreng et al., 2013). The coupled recruitment of these two
networks might represent a dynamic interplay whereby executive con-
trol regions guide, evaluate, and select among the various spontaneous
streams of thoughts,memories, and imaginings offered up to conscious-
ness by the DMN (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014b; Fox and Christoff,
2014; Fox et al., in press).Activations outside the default mode and frontoparietal control networks
The co-activation orﬂexible coupling of theDMNand fronto-parietal
control networks is not sufﬁcient to explain all the consistent activa-
tions associated with spontaneous thought: numerous other areas
need to be accounted for, including right secondary somatosensory cor-
tices (BA 5/40), the left mid-insula (BA 13), and the left lingual gyrus
(BA 19/18/30), and possibly the temporopolar cortex (BA 38; the inclu-
sion, or not, of this region within the DMN remains controversial, and
the cluster we observed lies outside the typically-deﬁned DMN area;
see Fig. 3). The cluster in the left medial temporal lobe also extended
somewhat into the cerebellum. First-person reports of the subjective
content of spontaneous thought shed some light on the potential role
of these regions, however: a large proportion of mind-wandering con-
tent involves faint-to-immersive visual imagery in one form or another
(Delamillieure et al., 2010), and thoughts centering on the body (includ-
ing exteroceptive and interoceptive information) are also very common
(Fox et al., 2013; Klinger, 2008).
The secondary somatosensory cortex and the insula represent two of
the major cortical centers for processing exteroceptive and interocep-
tive body information, respectively (Craig, 2004, 2009; Critchley et al.,
2004; Farb et al., 2013; Penﬁeld and Boldrey, 1937; Penﬁeld and
Rasmussen, 1950). Although the role of the insula, in particular, maye network and frontoparietal control network. Signiﬁcantmeta-analytic clusters associated
with outlines of the default mode network (blue) and the frontoparietal control network
also include regions beyond both networks (e.g., in temporopolar cortex, insula, secondary
tal control network masks based on aggregate data from 1000 subjects as reported by Yeo
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cesses (Singer et al., 2009), a role for these regions in the ‘somatic’ expe-
riences of spontaneous thought is one possibility.
The lingual gyrus is a downstreamvisual area of the occipital lobe in-
volved in ‘higher’ visual processing (Corbetta et al., 1990; Zeki et al.,
1991). Beyond its unambiguous role in color vision, our recent work
has shown that this area is consistently recruited during nighttime
dreaming (Domhoff and Fox, 2015; Fox et al., 2013) — which is almost
universally visual in nature (Schredl, 2010; Schwartz, 2000). Further,
neurological lesions in this area often lead to an inability to create visual
imagery and cessation of all visual dream imagery, but with otherwise
normal continuation of dreaming (Solms, 1997, 2000) — the classic
Charcot–Wilbrand syndrome (Charcot, 1883; Critchley, 1953;
Wilbrand, 1887). Following a detailed comparison of both subjective re-
ports and neural recruitment, we have further argued that nighttime
dreaming shows striking similarities to waking spontaneous waking
thought (Domhoff and Fox, 2015; Fox et al., 2013), of which the com-
mon recruitment of the lingual gyrus and the similarly high frequency
of visual imagery are but two instances. Although, as with the insula,
the role of the lingual gyrus in spontaneous thoughtmay havemany nu-
ances, onepossible explanation is involvement in the often-intensive vi-
sual imagery accompanying spontaneous thinking of various kinds
(Domhoff and Fox, 2015; Fox et al., 2013).
Finally, we observed a signiﬁcant cluster in the left temporopolar
cortex (BA 38). Although relatively poorly understood compared to
other neocortical regions, the temporopolar cortex appears to play a
strong role in integrated emotional processing involving visceral re-
sponses, as well as ‘theory of mind’ (or mentalizing) (Olson et al.,
2007). These putative roles for the observed temporopolar cortex clus-
ter are consistent with the ﬁndings that both mentalizing, and a wide
range of complex emotions, are ubiquitous features of spontaneous
thought (Fox et al., 2013, 2014; Klinger, 2008).
Neural correlates of speciﬁc spontaneous thought content
Subjective reports suggest a great variety of mind-wandering con-
tent, from seemingly pointless fantasizing, to complex planning for
the future, to the generation of creative ideas (Andrews-Hanna et al.,
2013, 2014b; Baird et al., 2011, 2012; Christoff, 2012; Delamillieure
et al., 2010; Diaz et al., 2013; Dixon et al., 2014; Ellamil et al., 2012;
Fox et al., 2013; Klinger, 2008; Stawarczyk et al., 2011a, 2013). It there-
fore seems likely that different forms and content of mind-wandering
entail at least partially dissociable neural correlates. Some important
empirical and theoretical steps have already been taken toward delin-
eating such functional speciﬁcity: for instance, Tusche et al. (2014) in-
vestigated the emotional content of unconstrained thoughts during
task-free rest periods using multivariate pattern analysis. They found
that patterns of activity within medial prefrontal cortex predicted the
valence (positive vs. negative) of thoughts — not just during the initial
session, but even at a follow-up scanning session one week later.
Other researchers, instead of directly contrasting one type of thought
with another, have instead used various measures of intrinsic connec-
tivity throughout the brain to attempt to predict either the content
(Gorgolewski et al., 2014) or frequency (Kucyi and Davis, 2014; Wang
et al., 2009) of spontaneous thought. Although all of these results re-
main tentative, the investigation of speciﬁc functional roles for the var-
ious brain networks and regions involved has undoubtedly begun in
earnest.
Temporal brain dynamics of spontaneous thought
A putative discussion of the functional role(s) of each region and
network would be incomplete without consideration of the speciﬁc
temporal sequence whereby some regions or networks may contribute
to the initial generation of thoughts, and others to their subsequent
elaboration and evaluation (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2014b; Fox et al.,under review). In addition to functional differences related to content
and emotional valence, there are likely subtle but important differences
in the timing with which these regions are recruited. For example, if
spontaneous thoughts are predominantly generated inmedial temporal
lobe structures, as is strongly suggested by neurophysiological investi-
gations in humans (e.g., Penﬁeld and Perot, 1963; Vignal et al., 2007),
these brain structures may come online ﬁrst during a mind-wandering
episode. If DMN regions reﬂect the initial affective and self-referential
elaboration of the spontaneously generated thoughts, they may come
online second. Finally, if regions of the frontoparietal control network
reﬂect further subsequent elaboration, monitoring, or control of mind-
wandering, they may be recruited last. These ideas remain speculative,
however; further investigations of the temporal dynamics of mind-
wandering are crucial for advancing our understanding of this phenom-
enon, and will ultimately require the combined use of modalities with
higher temporal resolution than fMRI, such as electroencephalography
(EEG) and magnetoencephalography (MEG). Such investigations
would be most meaningfully and beneﬁcially conducted within a
framework that takes a balancedwhole-brain approach to the contribu-
tion of different brain networks and regions, and does not restrict anal-
yses to just a fewDMN regions-of-interest. An appreciation of the highly
varied neural basis revealed here (Table 2) should help us to begin to
better model the momentary ﬂuctuations and temporal trajectory of
spontaneous streams of thought.
Implications for clinical disorders of spontaneous thought
Above, we discussed the idea that the DMN (especially medial tem-
poral lobe structures) may contribute to the actual arising of memories
and the stream of associated thoughts and imaginings. Higher executive
areas may, on the other hand, subsequently evaluate, monitor, and
guide the ﬂow of these thoughts toward desirable and beneﬁcial out-
comes (Fox and Christoff, 2014; Fox et al., in press). Given the evidence
that spontaneous thought involves a coupling of both DMN and
frontoparietal control network regions in normal, healthy subjects, im-
portant implications arise for clinical disorders of spontaneous thought.
For instance, preferential (or over-) activation of DMN regions in iso-
lation, with minimal or attenuated contributions from executive areas,
might characterize dysfunctional forms of spontaneous thought, such
as depressive rumination or the spontaneous and debilitating re-
experiencing characteristic of post-traumatic stress disorder (Fox
et al., under review). Conversely, an over-involvement of frontoparietal
control areas might characterize conditions like obsessive–compulsive
disorder, where ﬂeeting thoughts and urges are acted upon repeatedly
and with determination. If the distributed neural basis of spontaneous
thought is not appreciated, andDMN regions are preferentially or exclu-
sively investigated, links between such clinical disorders of spontaneous
thought and non-DMN brain regions might be missed.
Two highly-cited studies of depression (Berman et al., 2011;
Hamilton et al., 2011) exemplify this potential pitfall: both found links
betweenDMN activity and frequency of depressive rumination, but nei-
ther explored potential links with non-DMN areas, particularly execu-
tive areas of the frontoparietal control network. Yet one of these
groups'meta-analysis (Hamilton et al., 2012) has shown that several re-
gions beyond the DMN show abnormal activity in depression, including
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, insula, and dorsal anterior cingulate
cortex (note that the two latter regions are consistently recruited by
spontaneous thought— Table 2). In contrast, a recent study that did ex-
plore whole-brain relationships (Hach et al., 2014) found that de-
pressed patients showed altered patterns of functional connectivity
across numerous non-DMN areas, including the dorsal anterior cingu-
late cortex, as well as both the dorsolateral and the rostrolateral pre-
frontal cortex (all regions of the frontoparietal control network).
Although the study investigated deliberate past- and future-oriented
thought, and did not directly address ‘spontaneous’ forms of cognition,
similar differences in neural recruitment could also characterize the
619K.C.R. Fox et al. / NeuroImage 111 (2015) 611–621spontaneous thoughts of depressed patients. Such possibilities are
clearly worthy of further investigation with an unbiased, whole-brain
approach, not only for depression but also for other clinical conditions
characterized by disorders of spontaneous thought.
Limitations of the meta-analysis
A number of limitations of the present meta-analytic methods, as
well as of the primary research literature meta-analyzed, should be
kept in mind. First, differences in baselines and other control conditions
across studies are a source of heterogeneity. Collapsing across numerous
different baselines or control conditions is a common, indeed inevitable,
practice in any large meta-analysis of functional neuroimaging studies
(Salimi-Khorshidi et al., 2009; Svoboda et al., 2006; Wager et al., 2007,
2009). Nonetheless, the heterogeneity attributable to the many differ-
ent study designs concatenated here should be kept in mind.
Another concern is the wide variety of questionnaire and thought-
sampling methods employed to determine the content and frequency
of spontaneous thought. Although we would argue that subtle distinc-
tions between different kinds of spontaneous thought are premature
at this point, it should be acknowledged that various distinctive forms
of spontaneous cognition might eventually be differentiable both phe-
nomenologically, and potentially also at the neural level. The present
meta-analysis, collapsing over these potentially distinguishable forms
of spontaneous cognition, is meant merely as a preliminary effort at
synthesis.
A third point is the fairly small sample size of studies included in the
meta-analysis. Comparedwith processes likememory or attention, very
little neuroimaging research has investigated spontaneous thought pro-
cesses, and of this already small pool many studies have not employed
agnostic, whole-brain analyses suitable for inclusion in a quantitative
meta-analysis. As such, our meta-analytic results are based on a rela-
tively small (if rigorous, and rigorously selected) set of studies, and
should therefore be interpretedwith caution. Futureworkmay both ex-
tend and further clarify the results presented here.
Conclusions and future directions
The primary aim of this meta-analysis was to provide a quantitative
overview of the brain regions and networks consistently recruited by
mind-wandering and related forms of spontaneous thought. We found
that a wide variety of regions throughout all lobes and both hemi-
spheres appear to be reliably recruited. Most of these regions fall within
boundaries of the default mode or frontoparietal control networks, sug-
gesting that these networks, as presently conceptualized, form an im-
portant part of the neural signature accompanying, spontaneous
thought of various kinds. A number of other reliably activated regions
are not so easily subsumed under either of these networks (e.g., the
insula, the somatosensory cortices, and the lingual gyrus), suggesting
that future work may need to look beyond the typical delineation of
these two networks' contributions in order to construct a full account
of the neural recruitment associated with spontaneous thought.
The study of deliberate, goal-oriented, and externally-directedmen-
tal activity has been of paramount concern to cognitive neuroscientists
over the past few decades (Dixon et al., 2014). Although this work has
been, and remains, critical in advancing our understanding of brain
function, its dominance has led to the relative neglect among re-
searchers of spontaneous forms of cognition. To continue without
redressing this imbalance in our scientiﬁc focus would be to ignore
some of the most remarkable and complex processes of which our
brains are capable. A deeper investigation ofmore ﬂeeting, spontaneous
forms of cognitionwill be necessary tomove cognitive neuroscience to-
ward a neurobiological understanding of higher mental functions like
creativity and imagination. To paraphrase William James (James,
1985): No account of cognition in its totality can be ﬁnal which leaves
these other forms of consciousness quite disregarded.Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2015.02.039.Acknowledgments
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